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## REPORT

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# Soviet Policy towards Germany

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1. Whereas the Soviet Union's strategic objective remains unchanged, namely to bring West Germany and ultimately all of Europe under its sway, the speed of West Germany's recovery, its growing independence, and its immunity to Communist threats and blandishments must now have convinced the Russians that they cannot destroy the West German state by methods short of war.
2. A shift in emphasis is to be observed in recent Communist propaganda; the stress is less on American imperialism and more on German imperialism. Walter Ulbricht, in his speech to the SED Party Conference on 13 June 1951, stated that German imperialism is a force of far reaching independence, which now has a programme of its own, backed up by economic, military, and political power. Communist spokesmen keep repeating the threat that West German rearmament means war, since the Soviet Union sees a deadly menace to its security in the revival of German military power under Western auspices. Underlying this anxiety is the belief that the efficacy of the Atlantic Pact hinges on the successful harnessing of German war potential.
3. German militarism may be expected to ally itself with German irredentism, with a consequent danger to the status now existing in eastern and southeastern Europe. Mayor Ernst Reuter's address of 9 August, although it specifically disavowed any military crusade to regain the lost territories in the east, clearly expressed the refusal of the Germans to accept indefinitely the territorial status quo in eastern Europe. If the Americans sponsored German irredentism as well as a German army, the Russians would be convinced that a war of aggression against the Soviet Union would surely follow sooner or later.
4. Thus the predictions of the inevitability of war once Germany has a national army are not necessarily an empty threat, but may reflect a Kremlin decision to consider a German army, at some stage of its development, as a casus belli. On the other hand, the complete integration of German contingents in an Atlantic Pact army might be viewed with more equanimity. In any case, the Kremlin will wish to forestall the possibility of aggression by the West spearheaded by Germans, even if this involves resorting to open warfare.
5. In this connection it may be noted that there has been much discussion lately by Communist theoreticians of Lenin's doctrine of the just and unjust war. Special attention is paid to the theoretical justification for a revolutionary war of

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- 2 -

liberation begun by the USSR but caused by the necessity of repelling capitalist encirclement and "corresponding to the requirement of the further development of society".

6. On the whole, it seems unlikely that the Politbureau is anxious to start a preventive war or that such a war would be supported by public opinion in the U.S.S.R., in so far as a public opinion may be said to exist there. At the same time, however, the Politbureau's fear of "aggression" is genuine, and the revival of uncontrolled German militarism, especially the creation of a German General Staff, would give rise to great alarm and furnish a strong argument that the Soviet Union was in mortal danger. It would also weld the satellite orbit into a solid phalanx against the West much more effectively than Soviet terror and coercion have been able to do. The Kremlin's campaign against the rearmament of West Germany clearly reveals that the Soviet Union's chief concern is with the dynamic character of German imperialism, which would inject a new vigor into the relatively static alliance now existing under the Atlantic Pact.

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